



Russian-American conflict in Ukraine and its impact on the international order

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Abstract

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, represents one of the most serious geopolitical crises facing Europe after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s because it threatens the outbreak of a large-scale conflict on the European continent and threatens to destabilize the foundations of the global order dominated by the United States of America. It paves the way for the establishment of a new multipolar world order in which Russia and its ally China will have an effective role. Ukraine presents a new model of post-Cold War warfare, as it constitutes an important axis in the ongoing conflict between the major powers (Russia, the European Union, and the United States of America).

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, The United States of America, The Ukrainian crisis, The International system

Introduction

Throughout human history, wars have been a major means of bringing about changes and achieving major goals for the benefit of the initiator party, especially if there is a great disparity in the balance of power between that initiating party and the other party, as is the case in the Russian case against Ukraine. However, this balance is often subject to partial or complete change during the war as a result of the intervention of external parties whose main interest lies in thwarting the war objectives of the initiating party through direct intervention in the war or providing military and economic support to the other party, which makes the balance of power turn in its favor, repels aggression and achieves victory in one way or another. The Russian military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, represented one of the most serious geopolitical crises facing Europe after the end of the Cold War in the early nineties of the twentieth century because it threatened to expand the geographical scope of the war to include large areas of the European continent, especially after the recent trends of NATO's expansion strategy, and its quest to expand in Eastern Europe, Russia's neighboring countries, and the deployment of advanced defense systems and missiles in them. On the other hand, this proxy conflict over Ukraine represents a threat to destabilize the foundations of the prevailing world order based on unipolarity with the domination of the United States of America and its Western allies over global decision-making. The shift towards a multipolar system in which Russia and China have a place in exchange for US-European influence, and therefore, both sides have sought to resolve the crisis in a way that achieves its interests without considering its impact on the international system.

First: The subject of the research and its importance

The international system has more conflicts and less

cooperation, and this is a summary of what has happened in the world since Russia resorted to a military solution in the Ukrainian crisis on the twenty-fourth of February 2022, and these indicators of the crisis that the international system is going through and these conflicts are more severe, while the mechanisms of control and conflict resolution available to put an end to these conflicts have failed, which basically indicates the inability of major countries to reach agreements and settlements among themselves.

The war in Ukraine is one of the most serious forms of international conflict as a result of its location in the east of the continent of Europe, in addition to the size and number of parties to the war intervening directly or indirectly, so it is considered a systemic conflict par excellence, Russia is a major nuclear power. However, its economic power is second-class. It is fighting the war under the slogan of searching for a new multipolar international order; Ukraine is also fighting the war on behalf of the United States and NATO, which seek to curb Russian influence.

The Russian-American conflict in Ukraine is an important link in a series of global geopolitical tensions, which emerged in the state of severe tension in international relations, as well as the accompanying military escalation that led to the divergence of global influence between the two major powers, in light of the United States' quest to besiege Russia within its borders, and Russia's efforts to strengthen its areas of influence in its neighboring territories (states) or restore former Soviet glories. The importance of this study comes from identifying the course of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis that occupied the world after the calm period that governed relations between Russia and the United States of America after the events of the Soviet collapse; the study also tries to shed light on the most important issues that emerged and coincided with that war and reveal its repercussions on the international system.

Second: The problem of the subject

The problem of the research lies in considering that the US-Russian conflict over Ukraine is a global war behind which major world powers stand, and therefore, its repercussions are serious and could portend the outbreak of a third world war, in addition to the effects that this war produces on the world order.

Third: Research hypothesis

The research proceeds from the premise that the Ukrainian crisis appears to be a war between Russia and Ukraine, but in fact, it is a hidden conflict between Russia on the one hand and the European Union and NATO led by the United States of America on the other; this war has repercussions that are not limited to the parties within it only, but extend to the national and global framework of other countries. The consequences of the US-Russian conflict over Ukraine will directly affect the international system and the strategic balance of power in international relations.

Fourth: Research methodology

The study uses the descriptive analytical approach, which is to describe the studied phenomenon by collecting codified information about the problem, classifying it, analyzing it, and subjecting it to careful study; this approach is also used as a means of analysis and interpretation in a practical and organized way, in order to reach specific goals for the situation or a particular problem. The historical approach was also used to demonstrate the importance of Ukraine to international powers.

Fifth: Research plan

In light of the foregoing, we proceeded to divide the research into two sections. We dealt in the first section with the Russian-American conflict over Ukraine, and we dealt in the second section with the Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the future of the international system.

The first topic**Russian-American conflict over Ukraine****Boot**

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has gained independence, became an independent state with Kyiv as its capital, and joined the autonomous republic of Crimea. However, the relationship between Ukraine and its neighbor Russia has not been stable due to conflict, tension, and Russia's fear of Kiev's loyalty to the Western camp that includes the United States and the European Union, which it considers one of the most serious threats to its security ^[1].

What is happening in Ukraine cannot be considered just an internal crisis, as it seems the role of the international conflict and the interventions of major powers in fueling the Ukrainian crisis, and the crisis reflects the intense international competition for areas of influence and confirms that despite the disappearance of the ideological contradiction and the existence of common interests and understandings between the United States of America and Russia with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the strategic and interest contradiction still exists between them ^[2].

The first section can be presented through two requirements. The first requirement deals with the historical background of the Russian-American conflict over Ukraine, while the second requires U.S. policy toward Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

First requirement**Historical background of the Russian-American conflict over Ukraine**

The signs of the Ukrainian crisis began with the pursuit of NATO and the United States of America to extend its influence in the east of the European continent, which was a field of conflict between the United States and its Western allies and the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early nineties, the alliance countries tried to reassure the countries of the former Soviet Union not to expand towards them, but the alliance's attempt to expand towards those countries, To the borders of the Russian Federation, especially Ukraine, whose president expressed his country's desire to join the European Union and NATO, which was one of the main reasons that prompted Russia to intervene militarily to dissuade the Ukrainian president from his endeavor.

Section I**A brief history of Russian-American relations****First: The bonds of the Ukrainian crisis (2004-2014)**

The beginnings of the Ukrainian crisis date back to the event the so-called Orange Revolution, a popular revolution that took place on November 22, 2004, in Ukraine to demand an end to Russian interference in the affairs of the country, the fight against political, financial and administrative corruption, and the establishment of democratic institutions capable of achieving the hopes of the Ukrainian people, after they questioned the integrity of the presidential elections won by the pro-Russian president, Jankovic, so those pro-Western parties called civil disobedience and gather in front of the presidential palace to demand re-election ^[3].

The results of the election won by Yanukovich were annulled due to manipulation of the electoral process, and the masses took to the streets carrying orange banners. Under street pressure, the elections won by the pro-Western Yushchenko were re-held, which Russia considered a conspiracy, and Russia accused the West of interfering in Ukraine's internal affairs; five years later, the Ukrainians overthrew the regime of the leader of the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko, and then his partner, Yuliyatymoshenko, who failed to bring prosperity to the Ukrainian people and the government's impotence ^[4]. These events were accompanied by the widening of disagreement within the Ukrainian parliament, which was divided between pro-Western and pro-Russian. However, the victory of the pro-Western bloc at the beginning of 2009 exacerbated the crisis and prompted Russia to raise gas prices and stop supplies to Ukraine. These measures deepened in conjunction with the repercussions of the global financial crisis and Ukraine's already very difficult economic conditions during that period. But the elections that took place in early 2010 led to a change

in the course of events with the victory of the pro-Russian Yanukovich, which restored Russian-Ukrainian relations to their former state, but events quickly worsened with the refusal of "Yanukovich" to sign a free trade agreement with the European Union ^[5], along with Protests against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich after he signed an agreement with Russia that provided Ukraine with a \$51 billion loan and preferential benefits on natural gas prices of up to a third of its price compared to prices in the rest of the former Soviet republics, but the Ukrainian people rejected this agreement ^[6]. The holding of the "Vilnos" summit for the Eastern Partnership Project on November 28 and 29, 2013, coincided with the tenth anniversary of the 2004 summit in which it was decided to accept the membership of ten Eastern European countries in the European Union, but this summit came in a completely different reality than expected, as it was held in a tense atmosphere after Ukraine announced the suspension of negotiations with the European Union on the Association Agreement between Brussels and Kyiv, which was to be signed during this summit. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich (later deposed), a week before attending the summit, announced that his country would wait for better conditions to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union so that this agreement would be more in line with Ukrainian interests ^[7].

Therefore, the Ukrainian crisis was renewed during December 2013 in the form of widespread popular protests against the refusal of the (government of the deposed Ukrainian President) Viktor Yanukovich to sign a free trade and association agreement with the European Union. Therefore, the relationship with the European Union was the main axis of the Ukrainian crisis and led to the second Ukrainian uprising in less than ten years ^[8].

Second, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its repercussions

On February 22, 2014, under pressure from the streets, the Ukrainian parliament dismissed President Viktor Iannukovich in a revolution that Ukrainians called the Revolution of Dignity ^[9]. On February 28, 2014, Russia took advantage of the chaos in Ukraine and annexed Crimea, which Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had annexed to Ukraine in 1954 ^[10], after a popular referendum was held on March 16, 2014, under the pretext of protecting citizens of Russian origin. The ^[11] Ukrainian government also rejected Crimea's accession to Russia without the consent of the central authorities, which it considered a clear violation of international law requiring the approval of the central authority to hold the referendum. On May 25, 2014, Petro Poroshenko was chosen as the new president of Ukraine, and battles began between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian army ^[12].

There is no doubt that the Russian position in Crimea was based on a set of internal and external Russian calculations, as Russia must control Crimea if it wants to restore its power and global standing and will not allow Ukraine to join the West if it wants to maintain its backyard (near neighborhood), in which Ukraine constitutes a strategic depth for it, and is considered as

a barrier in the face of Western influences, while the city of "Sevastopol on the Black Sea" is the main base of the Russian fleet on the location of Crimea is very special and gives Russia an influential character, both in the Black Sea region and in the Mediterranean region. International parties made efforts to contain the Ukrainian crisis immediately after it erupted, such as the first Minsk agreement between the separatists and the Ukrainian government in September 2015, and the second Minsk agreement was signed by France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, which provided for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. There is no doubt that this agreement contributed to easing tensions with Russia and opening the door for negotiations, but the Ukrainian government insisted on the need to deploy peacekeepers in eastern Ukraine. Many studies agree that the Russian intervention in Ukraine came to achieve geo-strategic goals related to Russian President Vladimir Putin's understanding of Russia's security, as a superpower with a vital field, does not accept military alliances on its borders, and wants to impose its prestige and respect its interests on those who seek to harm those interests ^[13].

Thus, the prelude was made to a long civil war that resulted in some 14,000 deaths and the resumption of the Cold War, especially after the West showed that it was not interested in taking into account Russian strategic interests after the new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who was elected in May 2019, expressed his intention to continue to strengthen his country's orientation towards the West ^[14].

On November 10, 2021, Washington asked Russia for clarification on the unusual movements of its troops on the Ukrainian border, while the Russian president accused the West of delivering weapons, sending military personnel to Kyiv, and conducting "provocative" military exercises in the Black Sea and near the Russian border. On January 10, 2022, the Russians and Americans held tense talks in Geneva, and then a few days later, a meeting was held between Russian and NATO representatives, during which NATO representatives rejected Moscow's request that it would not the alliance included new members in the east in its ranks, and the absence of troops or military equipment in the countries that joined NATO after 1998 upset the strategic balance of power. On January 18, 2022, Moscow began deploying units of its army to Belarus, and it has since become clear that the solution to the Ukrainian crisis cannot reach a lasting political agreement that meets Russia's interests ^[15].

Section II

U.S. and Russian interests in Ukraine

What is happening in Ukraine cannot be considered just an internal crisis; it seems the role of the international conflict and the interventions of major powers in fueling the Ukrainian crisis and crisis reflects the intense international competition for areas of influence and confirms that despite the disappearance of the ideological contradiction between the United States of America and Russia with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the existence of common interests and understandings between the two countries, the strategic contradiction and interest still exists between them ^[16].

The Ukrainian crisis confirms once again the reformist nature of the foreign policies of the great countries, and once Russia recovered, it began trying to recover Ukraine, which gained independence in 1991, and attract it to a more balanced position in its foreign policy that corresponds to being a natural extension of Russia and a state in contact with Moscow on the one hand Europe and the Atlantic Alliance led by the United States of America on the other. The 2004 crisis represented a major entry point for both powers to secure their interests, showing signs of a strong conflict between the United States and Russia. The form of intervention in resolving the crisis and directing its courses ^[17].

The Ukrainian crisis is an important axis in the bilateral relations between the two countries (the United States of America - Russia), where each country tried to show its strength in pursuit of its individual interests and to have the last word in resolving the crisis in order to achieve those interests and goals ^[18].

First: The strategic importance of Ukraine in the Russian perspective

Ukraine's importance to the Russian Federation has varied geopolitically, economically, and logistically, so Ukraine's importance to Russia is due to its historical, geographical, economic, and cultural linkage with it. Ukraine's large area, its distinctive terrain, more than 90% of which is plains, and its view of warm waters (the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea), make it in the Russian perception its backyard ^[19].

Ukraine has great strategic importance for Russia, due to several important considerations, including: that many Russian weapons are produced by Ukrainian military factories, including engines of Russian combat helicopters, as well as engines of many Russian warships, in addition to that most Russian missile warheads are launched through missiles that are produced either fully or partially in Ukrainian factories, and More than half of the components of intercontinental ballistic missiles in Ukraine, and can carry about 80% of Russian warheads, and perhaps the most prominent example of this is the complex "Yuzhmash" (Yuzhmash) in Ukraine, which is part of the strategic factories of the former Soviet Union, and the annual production capacity of this complex is 120 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and Ukraine depends on Russia's energy and fuel consumption, and it is noteworthy that the sustainable development of the Ukrainian economy depends on Importing energy resources, i.e. oil and gas primarily from abroad ^[20].

The Russian fleet is also stationed at the "Sevastopol" naval base in Crimea, which shows its importance in that controlling it means controlling the Black Sea and the areas bordering it, and therefore Russia has been keen to keep its fleet in the Black Sea there since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, through the conclusion of agreements with successive Ukrainian governments, and therefore Crimea has become of geostrategic importance and is located within the scope of Russian vital interests that cannot be waived, and perhaps this is what Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed for the annexation of the island to Russia ^[21].

Ethnically, the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine belong to Russia, and Russians constitute approximately 17 per cent of Ukraine's population ^[22], which is reflected in the nature of Russian identity. In addition to the above, Ukraine is part of Russian history and memory ^[23] and is considered one of the components of Russian identity, in addition to being a strategic port essential to Russia's vital interests. Ukraine is also strategically important for the Russian energy security system, as it represents the transit point for Russian natural gas to Europe and is the link to most of the infrastructure of Russian industries, whether through pipelines, roads, and railways ^[24]. The importance of Russian calculations in the Ukrainian crisis, which has turned into a proxy war arena, stems from fears that NATO and the European Union will expand in its vital space, reaching its immediate borders and then besieging and pressuring it politically, economically and militarily. Because Russia sees NATO's eastward expansion as an existential security threat, Russia will never accept Ukraine's admission to Western military, political, and economic institutions ^[25]. Russia demands that Ukraine stop attempts to regain areas controlled by Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass region, which includes the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the east of the country, and sees this as a violation of the provisions of the Minsk 1 protocols in 2014 and Minsk 2 in 2015, which were reached under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and provided for a form of autonomy in the two provinces ^[26].

Second: The strategic importance of Ukraine in the American perspective

Ukraine, which gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, occupies a sensitive position between Russia and the member states of NATO ^[27], and the American and European view is summarized that the presence of a strong and independent Ukraine is an important part of building a complete, free and secure Europe, and the completion of operations to secure Europe requires limiting the expansion of Russian influence in Eastern Europe and reaching the nearest geographical point in contact with the Russian border by extending the umbrella of security protection and economic partnership to Ukraine. Ukraine's location is a strategic and geopolitical axis of great importance, as Ukraine is of vital importance to the United States of America, geopolitical and geostrategic that begins with besieging the Russian sphere of influence, and Ukraine's ports are important to NATO when they enter the Black Sea ^[28].

Russia and Ukraine also play an important role in exporting natural gas, oil, coal, wheat, and other commodities to the global market, and reports indicate that both countries produce 70% of the world's neon, a vital commodity in the production of semiconductors, which caused a crisis for automakers that are already witnessing its scarcity in computer chips, and both countries are responsible for 13% of the global supply of titanium, which is used in the manufacture of aircraft, as well as 30% of palladium. Palladium is part of the platinum metal family, and jewelry experts consider it an alternative to gold or platinum and is used in the automotive industry and mobile

phones, and this crisis will have negative economic effects not only on Russia and Ukraine but on the European Union and the United States of America as well, and one of the most important expected effects of Russia's war on Ukraine is high inflation rates due to increased oil prices, increased food prices, and high prices of raw materials around the world ^[29].

In order to analyze the reasons for the movement of the West and Russia and their arrival in the current crisis situation, it is possible to look closely at the current political map of the central region separating them and the reality of competition for influence in it ^[30].

- Today, most of the large countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, enjoy full membership in the European bloc in its form represented by the European Union or its military body represented by NATO. Its Western affiliation has been strengthened after the overlap of the interests of its people economically and politically, as well as security within the Western Atlantic system. These countries have become incapable of Russian influence in the face of Western influence. These countries represent the strategic depth and a primary line of defense for Western Europe.
- With the European Union concluding an association agreement with Ukraine in March 2014, it seeks to expand its influence to the largest Eastern European country, the most populous, and the deepest geographical extension towards Russia, which occupies more than half the length of the eastern gate and is thus considered its most important country ^[31].
- Consecrating the interests and influence of the West in Ukraine for Russia means extending its influence over the entire northern Black Sea, on the strategically and historically important Crimea peninsula, and with the presence of the Turkish ally of the West on the southern coast of this sea, Romania and Bulgaria on the west coast, and Georgia in part of the east coast, where the benefit of the seas strategically for the major country lies in the safe movement of its military fleets and their easy access to their destinations, perhaps this is what made Russia behave with conventional armed behavior despite the negative repercussions you expect from the reactions of the West.
- Suppose the conflict ends with the success of the United States and the West in extending the security and economic umbrella to Ukraine. In that case, only Bella Russia will remain pro-Russian and a barrier between Western and Russian influence, but Bella Russia will remain surrounded from the north, south, and west by pro-Western allies, so it can be said that if Ukraine's integration into the entire Euro-Atlantic security economic integration process takes place, the West will deprive Russia of the central region that used to give an advantage. Strategy for Russian ground power ^[32].

Second requirement

US policy and Russian military intervention in Ukraine

Since Russia massed its military forces on the border with Ukraine in October 2021 and then its military intervention in

Ukrainian territory on February 24, 2022, the United States and its Western allies have faced one of the most difficult international crises since the end of the Cold War. This military intervention gave an exceptional opportunity to the United States of America to establish a negative image of the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin and portray it as representing a rogue regime at the global level; hence, the United States has become an important goal in this conflict is to deter Russia's long-term attempts to challenge American unilateral hegemony ^[33].

After about four months of direct Russian intervention in Ukraine, the Russian forces have not been able to achieve a fundamental breakthrough at the field level, despite a change in the Russian military strategy since mid-April 2022, which shifted from its main and declared goal of controlling the capital, Kyiv, and overthrowing the regime of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, to focusing on The Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, and its ground offensive has also encountered strong resistance that hinders its progress, due to the volume of military and logistical aid provided ^[34] by the United States of America and its allies to Ukraine, and thus the research raises important questions, including: What are the determinants of US policy towards the Russian-Ukrainian war? What is the nature of Western support for Ukraine, and what are its forms and manifestations? This can be focused on in this research requirement.

Section I

Determinants of US policy toward the conflict in Ukraine

The administration of US President Joe Biden has identified a set of political determinants that achieve strategic objectives to protect US interests from the repercussions of that crisis, including the following ^[35]:

1. Avoid direct military conflict with Russia

In its management of the Ukrainian crisis, Washington has set red lines, the most important of which is to avoid direct military confrontation with the Russian Federation, and in this context, the White House has repeatedly stressed that the United States will not send its military forces to Ukraine, as confirmed by US President Biden in his speech to him On February 24, 2022, he said that his country will not send troops on the ground in Ukraine. At the same time, Biden stressed that the United States would intervene if there was an attack on any NATO country and would work to activate its obligations under Article 5 of the alliance's charter.

2. Work to deter Russian military intervention in Ukraine

Based on two main interests of Washington, the first related to the protection of US interests in Europe and the negative repercussions that the scenario of Russian military intervention could have on it, and the second related to the "Chinese determinant" in the crisis, there were American assessments that this military intervention will encourage Beijing to apply what happened in Ukraine in dealing with its crisis with the West in Taiwan.

3. Working to ensure global energy security

Russia is one of the largest oil and gas exporters to the European continent, and therefore, any escalation or tension with it will affect the global energy market, foremost of which is the rise in oil and gas prices, which will directly reflect on the standard of living and income of the American citizen, and even on the American economy as a whole, which suffers. Therefore, ensuring the flow of oil and gas has become one of the most important goals of the US administration during its management of the Ukrainian crisis, and in this context, Washington held consultations with its allies, especially in the Middle East, to ensure work on finding alternatives to Russian oil and gas.

4. Preventing the fall of the Ukrainian government

US intelligence assessments confirmed that part of Putin's goals in his military action against Ukraine is to work to control the capital, Keiv, overthrow the regime of President Volodymyr Zelensky, and try to install a pro-Moscow government in Kiev, as part of Russia's vision on Ukraine, as it considers it part of Russia's biosphere countries.

When the Russian Foreign Ministry drafted Russian proposals on security guarantees that were sent to the US administration, which stipulated that both sides should abide by the following ^[36]:

- Not to participate, individually or within a military coalition or international organization, in any actions that harm each other's security and undermine each other's root security interests, with the need for any international military organizations or alliances of which they are members to abide by the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and not to use the territory of other States to prepare or carry out a military attack against each other.
- The United States undertakes to prevent NATO expansion eastward, not to allow the countries of the former Soviet republics to join NATO, not to establish any military bases in those non-NATO republics, and not to use infrastructure or territory for any military activity ^[37].
- The parties commit not to deploy forces and weapons, especially within the framework of international coalitions or international organizations, in areas where the other side considers the proliferation of such weapons and forces a threat to its security, except for deployment within the territories of the two states."

Section II

Features and features of US policy towards the Ukrainian crisis

There is no doubt that the US administration, in dealing with the crisis, was keen not to expand the conflict with Russia and not to develop to the point that Russia is pushing to use non-conventional weapons, but at the same time, it is working to provide all means of economic, military and logistical support to the Ukrainian regime in the face of the Russian army, in addition to a set of steps to deal with the threats and

repercussions resulting from the crisis, the most important of which are the following:

1. Providing types of support (political, military, economic) to Ukraine

The Biden administration has set a red line not to enter into a direct military conflict with Russia, and the absence of US military forces on Ukrainian soil, and at the same time, to find the necessary alternatives to support Ukraine in this war, where political support represented one of them through the political mobilization of European allies and continuous coordination with European countries and other key countries such as Canada and Japan. Publicly emphasizing the Ukrainian government and people and militarily working with the conservation of the ongoing flow of modern arms shipments to support the Ukrainian military, NATO countries have also approved the delivery of anti-armor missiles, drones, medium and long-range missiles, and other U.S. weapons to Ukraine ^[38].

Thus, the United States of America and its Western allies have provided various support to Ukraine in its war with Russia in several aspects, which appear as follows:

- **Logistical and intelligence support:** Where the United States worked through its intelligence capabilities to share sensitive intelligence information with the Ukrainian forces, it had an effective impact in directing Ukrainian forces effective strikes against the Russian forces, which was manifested in the Russian accusation of the United States being directly involved in the war, which may lead to the expansion of the scope of the war and an indication of the possibility of direct nuclear military confrontation between them, This was matched by Russian military measures to raise the nuclear alert of its strategic nuclear weapons, but at the same time Russian military controls allow the use of nuclear weapons only in the event of an existential threat to the state ^[39].
- **From a military point of view:** The large American and Western armament of Ukrainian forces has contributed to changing the balance of power on the ground, accompanied by poor Russian military planning, weak logistical supply lines, the absence of air coverage for the invading ground forces, and the failure to secure advanced communication systems to ensure that they are not spied on, all of which have caused heavy losses to Russian forces ^[40].

Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its European allies in NATO, and from outside them, such as Japan and South Korea, have provided billions of dollars in military assistance, such as light rocket launchers, Stinger and Javelin missiles, attack drones, radar systems, and disrupted communications and espionage. Washington provided Ukraine in 2021 with nearly \$ 450 million in military aid, according to the US Department of Defense report, and the value of US military aid to Ukraine since 2014 amounted to more than \$ 2.5 billion.

- **From an economic point of view:** The United States and its European and other allies imposed a series of successive diplomatic, economic, banking, technological, military, and technical sanctions, which were inflicted on a number of Russian banks and banks and important institutions and bodies in the state, and even went further, to also include the symbols of government in Russia in an effort to disrupt the structure of the regime of President "Vladimir Putin" from within. Indeed, these sanctions have succeeded in isolating Russia globally to a large extent and have clearly exhausted the Russian economy, which ranks eleventh in the world, worth \$ 1.7 trillion ^[41].

2. Affirmation of support for NATO countries

In February 2022, President Biden sent 3,000 US troops to Poland and Romania to strengthen NATO's role in Eastern Europe. At the same time, he sent seven thousand US troops to Germany to confirm the American protection umbrella for it after the Russian nuclear threat to it. These moves are in addition to coordination and continuous communication with NATO, with the aim of reassuring allies and sending a direct message that Washington will have a position if an attack occurs on any of the alliance countries ^[42].

The sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies on Russia were as follows ^[43]:

- The United States and its allies have imposed sanctions on one of Russia's largest banks, which plays a role in financing the activities of the Russian Defense Ministry as well as infrastructure projects, as a countermeasure for Moscow's official recognition of the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine and the movement of military equipment and forces in their territory.
- Deny Moscow access to funding from U.S. and European financial institutions. The new sanctions are designed to harm strategic sectors of the Russian economy, especially the technology, military, and space industries.
- US sanctions included Russian gas transmission lines, especially the Nord Stream line to transport gas between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea after Germany announced the suspension of its work.
- Work to prevent the circulation of Russian sovereign debt in the Western market, in addition to imposing sanctions on some wealthy Russians close to the Kremlin and their family members.
- Imposing sanctions targeting the Russian president and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, thus making Putin the first president of a major country to be subject to such sanctions.
- Limiting the ability of Russian banks, especially the Central Bank, to access foreign exchange reserves, estimated at \$ 630 billion, in addition to the sanctions imposed on the Russian sovereign wealth fund and its subsidiaries, poses great challenges to the Russian economy and trade.

The second topic

The Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the future of the international system

Boot

Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022, and the entry of Russian forces into the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, international relations have been greatly affected, energy and food security crises have worsened, and Europe has almost turned to fossil fuels as an alternative to energy. Which led to a decrease in global growth expectations and shocks in the supply of energy, commodities, and trade and high prices, which led to an increase in inflation globally, affected by some countries, especially the European Union, due to its greater dependence on Ukrainian and Russian products of energy, oil, and natural gas, and thus the effects of the crisis were not limited to the warring parties, but extend to reach the global system, which we will address in this section, and this section can be addressed through two requirements: The first demand is the Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the European Union economy, the second demand is the Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the global food and energy crisis and international security.

First requirement

The Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the EU economy

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian crisis has cast a negative shadow on many global economic sectors, especially on the European Union countries, and wars, in general, represent a drain on the economic resources of the warring countries due to their needs to harness many of them in the service of the war machine, which the demand seeks to discuss through the following:

Section I

The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russian and Ukrainian economies

First: The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russian economy

- After the Russian war on Ukraine in February 2022. The crises Russia was exposed to, as 7 Russian banks were excluded from the global SWIFT network in accordance with European Union regulations, and Britain also announced the freezing of Russian banking assets and their exclusion from the British financial system, as well as freezing the funds of Russian companies and governments operating in the British markets, setting a maximum limit for deposits of Russian citizens in British banks, and preventing companies operating in the British market from taking any financial transfers. With the Central Bank of Russia or the Russian Ministry of Finance, sanctions were imposed against a number of Russian personalities and banks, and their citizens were prohibited from conducting any dealings with the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance ^[44].
- Prevent Russian aircraft from flying over European airspace or landing at European airports.

- Suspension of import and export licenses from Russia and restrictions on Russian and British exports, especially military manufacturing materials and oil refining.
- More than half of Russian imports of high-tech goods have been prevented from entering the US territory.
- In Germany, permits to operate Russia's Nord Stream 2 pipeline to export gas to Europe have been suspended ^[45].

Second: The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Ukrainian economy

- As for Ukraine, the war in Ukraine has inflicted heavy losses on the country's infrastructure; in addition to the human losses, the economic losses are heavy, as ports and airports have been closed due to the damage they have suffered, many roads have been damaged, even destroyed, and it is clear that Ukraine will incur a high cost for its reconstruction. Ukraine has asked the International Monetary Fund for emergency financing of \$ 1.4 billion.
- On March 9, 2022, the IMF Executive Board approved Ukraine's request for assistance to meet its emergency financing needs and mitigate the effects of the economic war.
- The World Bank Group also explained that a third of Ukraine's 44 million people, more than 35 percent of the population, have been displaced by the war ^[46].

Section II

The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the global economy

Russia is one of the major exporters of oil, grains and other basic commodities, as the interruption of the supply chain has led to a sharp rise in global prices, especially oil and natural gas prices, and food costs have witnessed a jump in light of the historical level reached by wheat prices, so the global economy is facing a number of crises as a result of the Russian war on Ukraine, where expectations indicate a slowdown in global growth from 6% in 2021 to 3.2% in 2022, then 2.7% in 2023 and returns This is due to the noticeable economic slowdown in the largest economies, where the GDP of the United States of America shrank in the first half of 2022. Expectations indicated that global inflation rose from 4.7% in 2021 to 8.8% in 2022, and the sudden rise in the inflation rate was more widespread in advanced economies ^[47].

Russia's war on Ukraine has caused humanitarian crises, refugee migration, and displacement, as well as additional downside risks to the global economy, which is still reeling under the weight of the Covid-19 pandemic ^[48].

Russia and Ukraine have an important impact on the global economy through their role as major suppliers in a number of commodity markets, where their exports together represent about 39% of global exports of wheat, 29% of corn and mineral fertilizers, and 11% of oil and natural gas. In addition, supply chains around the world depend on mineral exports from Russia and Ukraine, and the prices of many of these commodities have risen sharply since the beginning of the war ^[49]. The effects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on slowing growth and accelerating inflation.

Second requirement

The Ukrainian crisis and its impact on the food crisis Global energy and international security

Since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the world has witnessed repercussions related to global food security and ensuring global food chains, especially since the two warring countries occupy an important place in the supply of wheat to many countries of the world. Russia has a special place within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries with regard to the production and export of oil and natural gas. All of these repercussions are aimed at enhancing the state of global security instability. Perhaps those effects flow through:

Section I

The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the global energy food crisis

First: The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the food crisis

Russia and Ukraine played in the global economy and the percentage of countries' dependence on them to achieve their strategic security, specifically their food security, Russia is the largest exporter of wheat in the world with 37.3 million tons per year, while Ukraine comes in fourth place with 18.1 million tons per year, and Arab countries alone will account for about 11% of global wheat exports, in light of these figures, it seems that the Arab countries are among the regions most affected by the crisis due to the lack of availability of food commodities from Ukraine and Russia. When there is increased demand, limited supplies, or supply chain disruptions, food prices rise, and food insecurity can destabilize communities, increase hunger and malnutrition, drive people into migration and conflict, and cause severe economic disruption ^[50].

Higher prices of commodities such as food will push inflation further and thus lead to serious shortages in many emerging markets and developing economies, thus increasing poverty and hunger ^[51].

Second: The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on global energy

The Russian-Ukrainian crisis affects all parts of the world, including the Middle East and North Africa region. Although Russia represents the largest country in the world in the production, reserves and consumption of oil and gas, with a production of about (10-11) million barrels of oil per day, it was a factor in the rise in oil prices due to its invasion of Ukraine, the imposition of sanctions on it and the refusal to import oil from it, in addition to other repercussions represented in Europe and the United States postponing the Nord Stream 2 project, which is a line Pipelines with Western investments to transport natural gas from the country. From Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany, the price of oil and natural gas fell indefinitely, driving up production costs. This led to higher commodity prices and high inflation, which affected the outcome of global growth ^[52].

As a result, there are a number of risks to food and energy, as follows:

- Agriculture will be disrupted, threatening global food security.

- Agricultural infrastructure will be destroyed, and the economy will be in big trouble.
- The price of flour will rise globally, which will lead to an increase in bread globally in importing countries.
- Electricity prices will rise all over the world.
- Sharp changes in the trade policy of exporting countries and major import destinations.
- Abnormal climatic conditions that damage agricultural production ^[53].

Section II

The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the maintenance of international peace and security

The International Thought Since the inception of the international organization represented by the United Nations and its various organs in order to work to maintain international peace and security, the Charter of Nations has been keen to renounce the resort to force in international relations, and to emphasize the adoption of peaceful and friendly ways in resolving international disputes, and such as the use of military force by Russia in order to preserve its interests and resolve its differences is a catalyst for its use, contrary to what was brought by the international organization in the modern era, It reached the point of mobilizing the nuclear power between Russia and NATO countries, and Russia's interview with the actions of Western countries and the United States by sending more arms shipments to target Russian territory towards Russia towards supporting countries that lead conflicts with the United States and the West, including (Cuba - North Korea) and others, and the most important of these effects can be monitored in the following:

- Destroying the idea of collective security and the signs of a third nuclear world war. As a result of the intense competition and conflict among the five GCC States and their division within the Security Council into eastern and western blocs, the Security Council has become powerless and almost paralyzed as a result of this war and the use of military force. China and Russia have the veto power to block the sanctions resolution, and this exposes the United Nations to the same fate and end as its predecessor, the League of Nations, on the grounds that it has not achieved the basic goal on which it was founded, which is to prohibit the use of force, maintain international peace and security, and respect the sovereignty of states ^[54].
- The emergence of the phenomenon of foreign and Russian fighters produced another phenomenon, which is the phenomenon of returnees from conflict areas, who are mercenaries working under the banner of the Russian security company "Wagner", as well as categories of foreign fighters in Ukraine against Russia, and they hold the nationalities of a number of European countries and some of them have dual nationality inside Ukraine. It is estimated that their number has reached more than 66 thousand. They have family roots in Ukraine, which is the country of their ancestors, and have a duty to defend its territory. The second category is foreigners coming from foreign countries and have no family or nationality roots linked to Ukraine or any family history there ^[55].
- The proliferation of modern civil and military surveillance satellites and the escalation of the roles of drones in land wars make this a violation of the principle of state sovereignty.
- The spread of rumors that threatens the internal stability of countries, especially with regard to food security and production chains.
- ^[56] Rising flows of refugees and displaced persons through irregular migration.

Conclusion

The study dealt with the following sections: "dimensions of the Russian-American conflict over Ukraine and its developments" and the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the international system. The study answered the research questions posed in the general framework of the study. The study reached a set of results, the most important of which can be clarified as follows:

- Russia cannot withdraw from Ukraine or leave it to become part of the European Union or NATO, due to Russia's historical nationalist sentiment towards Ukraine, as it is located in its immediate vicinity, with an area of about 603,000 square kilometers, which is huge for Russia. It consists of a large human mass of about 44 million people, making it the vast and last strategic bulwark that spares Russia, the West, and its allies. It cannot be abandoned, especially after Crimea is considered part of Russia after its annexation because it wants to ensure the permanent presence of its fleet in the Middle Sea. Without a joint agreement with Ukraine.
- The West cannot back down from Ukraine, as it could send a negative message to its other allies in Eastern Europe that it is unreliable and unreliable if they are also threatened by Russia, especially if it regains its former regional and international status.
- Russia was able to defy the Western world and continue the war thanks to its use of energy weapons, giving it an important strategic power. Hence, it can be said that the economic factor gives any country an important regional and strategic power, and any country must build its economy on the basis of the natural and human capabilities it possesses and exploit them optimally and not depend on any country.
- The Russian-Ukrainian war led to a rise in the prices of basic commodities such as wheat, which made many countries face the problem of meeting their needs for these basic materials, which they import mainly from Russia and Ukraine, and food security has become threatened in many countries of the world; hence it has become necessary to think seriously about improving and developing local production instead of relying on imports and achieving self-sufficiency by directing efforts towards developing the agricultural sector and the food industry and avoiding the scarcity of food refund or price hikes due to wars or tensions that have occurred or may occur.

- IMF staff pointed to the importance of a global safety net and the development of regional arrangements to protect economies from shocks, and countries must adhere to the principle of caution and avoid various pressures that may result from security or political reasons that can affect the economic aspect, such as establishing an economic partnership based on diversity in the parties and the establishment of their own networks for money transfer that work efficiently and the formation of foreign currency reserves that help them reduce the effects of crises.

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